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1 Introduction
We study the behavior of several notions of competitive equilibrium and core in
economies with differential information. Our aim is to check whether these so-
lution concepts respond continuously to changes in agents’ characteristics in the
underlying economy. This is a basic problem in general equilibrium theory, that
was studied by several authors in the context of economies with complete informa-
tion. For instance, Kannai (1970) considered continuity properties of the core of a
pure exchange economy, while Hildenbrand (1972) and Hildenbrand and Mertens
(1972) investigated the continuity of the equilibrium-set correspondence. It turns
out that both solution concepts are “upper semi-continuous”: when the agents’char-
acteristics converge, together with a selection from the solution of corresponding
 We wish to thank Carlos Herves, Nicholas Yannelis, and an anonymous referee for their helpful
comments.
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economies, then the limit of the selection belongs to the solution of the limiting
economy.
In an economy with differential information every agent is characterized by
his initial endowment of commodities (which is a random variable, whose value
is determined by the realization of the state of nature), his state-dependent utility
function, and his private information represented by a σ-field on the space of states
of nature (i.e., an agent can tell whether the realized state of nature is contained
in any given set from the field). In measuring “closeness” of these economies, the
only non-standard part lies in evaluating the “distance” between agents’information
endowments. We do so by means of Boylan (1971) metric, followingAllen (1983)
who was the first to apply topologies on information fields to economies with
differential information. (Allen proved continuity1 of the consumer demand and
the value of information with respect to the Boylan metric.)
We first consider a notion of competitive equilibrium for economies with dif-
ferential information, the Walrasian expectation equilibrium (WEE), introduced in
Radner (1968, 1982)2. In a WEE, all commodities are priced in every state of na-
ture, and each agent maximizes ex-ante (expected) utility on his budget set, but his
trades must be measurable with respect to his private information. We show that if
the space of random commodity bundles is Lmp (where m is the number of com-
modities, and 1 ≤ p < ∞) and the prices lie in its dual, thenWEE correspondence
is upper semi-continuous (see Theorem 1).
We do not consider an alternative equilibrium concept, that of “rational expec-
tations,” in studying continuity of equilibrium correspondences, because the lack
of continuity is apparent in this case. Indeed, in a rational expectations equilibrium
agents maximize their interim utility – expected utility conditional on private infor-
mation and the information revealed by prices. Information revealed by prices may,
however, have noticeable discontinuity in the transition to the limiting economy.
An extreme example of such a discontinuity is provided by a sequence of fully re-
vealing equilibrium price systems that converges to a constant price system, which
of course reveals no information. This discontinuity of revealed information trans-
lates into discontinuity of the rational expectations equilibrium correspondence:
the limit of agent’s commodity bundles in equilibrium allocations may well be a
suboptimal choice for the agent given the information revealed by prices in the
limiting economy.
Our second focus is on core correspondences. In the literature there are several
notions of core for economies with differential information (for a comprehensive
survey see Glycopantis andYannelis, 2004; Forges et al., 2002). Among them, two
notions stand out in having the important and useful property of being nonempty un-
der quite general conditions on the economy. These areWilson (1978) coarse core,
where a blocking coalition considers its interim payoffs (following the revelation
of private information to agents) given a common knowledge event, and Yannelis
1 Cotter (1986, 1987) showed that continuity properties could be obtained with a weaker topology.
Stinchcombe (1990) derived further results for both topologies. Van Zandt (2002) studied continu-
ity of solutions to constrained maximization problems with respect to the Cotter (1986) topology on
information fields.
2 The Walrasian expectations equilibrium is sometimes also referred to as Radner equilibrium.
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(1991) private core, where blocking is based on ex-ante payoffs, but measurability
of all allocations with respect to agents’ private information is required. We will
confine our attention to these core correspondences.3
The relation between the private core and WEE is analogous to that of the
core and Walrasian equilibrium in a complete information economy – see Einy
et al. (2001) for an equivalence result for economies with differential information
and a continuum of traders. Despite this relation, it turns out that the private core
correspondence differs from the WEE correspondence in its behavior. We show
here that the private core correspondence may not be upper semi-continuous even
in simple economies (see Example 1). However, the private core correspondence is
upper semi-continuous for every converging sequence of economies where agents’
information fields approach their limiting information fields from above (i.e., in the
sequence agents are better informed than in the limit); see Theorem 2.
The private core correspondence is also upper semi-continuous when the lim-
iting economy is a complete information economy (see Theorem 3). This is in line
with the earlier result of Balder and Yannelis (2002). They showed upper semi-
continuity of the private core correspondence under very general conditions on the
economies4, but required the quality of information along the converging sequence
to be monotonically increasing, which is not needed in our setup.At the same time,
our Theorem 3 stands in contrast to Krasa and Shafer (2001), that showed disconti-
nuity of this correspondence when the agents’ common prior5 over the set of states
of nature changes, in a way that the information becomes complete in the end. Here
we view the common prior as an invariable characteristic of the economy6 (together
with the set of agents, commodities, and the states of nature), and not as part of
the agents’ characteristics. Accordingly, in all our results the information fields of
the agents (and their other characteristics) are allowed to change, but the common
3 Apart from the non-emptiness of these two core correspondences, there are more reasons for
focusing attention only on them. As we shall see, neither one of these correspondences is upper semi-
continuous in general, and we believe that with other core concepts, conceived in the similar spirit, the
situation will likely be the same. Moreover, when incentive compatibility constraints are added to the
notion of core (see Vohra, 1999), restrictive assumptions must be imposed on the way the information
is revealed, in order for the “reports” of agents to be well defined. In our setup, these restrictions take
the following form: the information fields would have to be generated by partitions of the space of
states of nature (a report is then simply an element of the paritition). Accordingly, an element of the
incentive compatible core, which is a mechanism defined on products of all reports, changes its domain
when the information endowments (the partitions) in the economy undergo changes. This introduces an
additional difficulty in studying the behavior of this core correspondence, since it is not obvious how to
define convergence of incentive compatible mechanisms with changing domains.
4 Balder and Yannelis (2002) only require weak convergence of core allocations in the sequence,
while we need the Lm1 -norm convergence (see Sect. 2). Also, they work with significantly weaker
assumptions on the space of states of nature and the utility functions, and allow for state-dependent
consumptions sets.
5 To interpret the model of Krasa and Shafer (2001) in our setting, one has to view this common
prior as defined on the product of the set of states of nature and the signals receivable by agents, rather
than the set of states of nature alone (as we do here, with information fields as a device of revealing
information).
6 Or, more precisely, of its information structure determined by the underlying economic data.
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prior stays fixed. This is precisely what allows us to obtain the positive result of
Theorem 3.
Finally, we examine the coarse core correspondence, and find that it is also
fragile, and may fail to be upper semi-continuous even when the private core cor-
respondence is (see Example 2).
2 The model
We consider a pure exchange economy E with differential information. The com-
modity space is Rm+ . The set of agents is N = {1, 2, ..., n}. The uncertainty in
the economy is described by a probability space (Ω,, µ), where Ω is the space
of states of nature, which we assume to be compact and metrizable,  is a σ-field
of subsets of Ω, and µ is the common prior of the agents - a (countably additive)
probability measure on (Ω,). Private information of agent i ∈ N is given by a
σ-subfield i of ; that is, for every A ∈ i agent i knows whether the realized
state of nature is contained in A.
For any 1 ≤ p < ∞ we write Lmp for the Banach space of all -measurable
functions7 x : Ω → Rm such that ‖x‖p ≡ (
∫
Ω
‖x(ω)‖pdµ(ω)) 1p < ∞ (here ‖ · ‖
stands for the Euclidean norm on Rm). It is well known that Lmp ⊂ Lm1 and that
convergence in the Lmp -norm implies convergence in the Lm1 -norm.
Given S ⊆ N, an S-assignment in economy E is an S-tuple x = (xi)i∈S of
non-negative functions (commodity bundles) in which xi ∈ Lm1 for every i ∈ S.An
N -assignment is simply referred to asassignment. There is a fixed initial assignment
of commodities in the economy, e = (e1, ..., en); ei is referred to as the initial
endowment of agent i. An S-allocation is an S-assignment x = (xi)i∈S that8
satisfies the feasibility constraint:∑
i∈S
xi(ω) ≤
∑
i∈S
ei(ω) for (µ-)almost every ω ∈ Ω. (1)
Given a subfield ′ of , we use the extended notion of ′-measurability by
calling a function, which is equal µ-almost everywhere to an ′-measurable func-
tion, also ′-measurable. A private S-allocation is an S-allocation x = (xi)i∈S
such that xi is i-measurable for every i ∈ S. An N -allocation (respectively,
private N -allocation) is called an allocation (respectively, private allocation). We
assume that the N -tuple of the initial endowments e = (e1, ..., en) is a private
allocation.
The preferences of agent i over the commodity space are represented by a state-
dependent utility function, ui : Ω × Rm+ → R+, measurable with respect to the
product field × B (where B is the σ-field of Borel sets in Rm+ ) and continuous9.
7 Or, to be precise, their equivalence classes, where any two functions which are equal µ-almost
everywhere are identified.
8 For any two vectors x = (x1, ..., xm), y = (y1, ..., ym) ∈ Rm we write x ≥ y when xk ≥ yk
for every k = 1, ...,m, and x > y when x ≥ y and x = y.
9 Continuity of u implies its × B-measurability when  is the σ-field of Borel sets in Ω.
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We will always assume that ui(ω, ·) is concave on Rm+ for every ω ∈ Ω, and
non-decreasing. If x = (x1, ..., xn) is an assignment, we denote
U i
(
xi
)
=
∫
Ω
ui
(
ω, xi (ω)
)
dµ, (2)
whenever the integral exists.
To sum up, an economy with differential information, E , is described by a
collection (ei, ui,i)ni=1.
A possible interpretation10 of the above economy is the following. It extends
over two periods of time. In the first period there is uncertainty about the state
of nature. In this period, agents make contracts on redistribution of their initial
endowments either before the state of nature is realized (ex-ante) or after receiving
their private information (interim). In the second period agents carry out previously
made agreements, and consumption takes place.
In order to define convergence of economies with differential information, we
use a pseudo-metric (introduced in Boylan, 1971) on the family ∗ of σ-subfields
of , given by
d (1,2) = sup
A∈1
inf
B∈2
µ (A	B) + sup
B∈2
inf
A∈1
µ (A	B) ,
where A	B = (A\B) ∪ (B\A) is the “symmetric difference” of A and B. Con-
sider a sequence {Ek}∞k=1 of economies Ek = (eik, uik,ik)ni=1 with differential
information. We say that {Ek}∞k=1 converges11 to an economy E = (ei, ui,i)ni=1
if for every i ∈ N :
i)12 eik →L
m
1
k→∞ e
i;
ii)13 uik →k→∞ ui uniformly on every compact subset of Ω × Rm+ ;
iii) ik →k→∞ i in Boylan pseudo-metric.
Finally, if X is a random variable on (Ω,, µ) and ′ is a σ-subfield of ,
denote by E(X | ′) the conditional expectation14 of X with respect to ′.
10 This paragraph is a quotation from Allen and Yannelis (2001), p. 265, slightly modified to fit our
setting.
11 We use the language of “convergence of economies” only for the sake of convenience. As was
mentioned in the introduction, the convergence here is actually restricted to the agents’ characteristics.
12 By “→L
m
p
k→∞” we denote convergence in the L
m
p -norm.
13 Note that with this form of convergence of utility functions, the underlying preferences may fail to
converge (for instance, when uik is defined as 1k u for some utility function u, the sequence {uik}∞k=1
converges to ui ≡ 0). However, this only makes our upper semi-continuity results (Theorems 1, 2, and
3) stronger, since there is no explicit assumption on convergence of the underlying preferences.And the
discontinuity we show in Examples 1 and 2 is not due to this phenomenon: in both examples, utility
functions of agents are fixed for all economies.
14 Since E(X | ′) is usually defined as a class of functions, we will always take a selection from it.
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3 Continuity of Walrasian expectations equilibrium correspondence
Radner (1968, 1982) introduced the notion of Walrasian expectations equilibrium
(WEE) for economies with differential information. In this section we study con-
tinuity of the WEE correspondence.
In what follows we consider commodity bundles that are members of Lmp ,
for some given p ≥ 1. Let E = (ei, ui,i)ni=1 be an economy with differential
information. A price system π is a non-negative function in the unit sphere of Lmq
(i.e., ‖π‖q = 1), where q ∈ (1,∞] is such that 1p + 1q = 1. It is elementary that any
price functional ϕ in the economy (which is a continuous linear functional of norm
1 on Lmp , restricted to the cone of commodity bundles in Lmp ) is representable by a
unique price system πϕ : for any commodity bundle x, ϕ(x) =
∫
Ω
πϕ ·xdµ. Given
a price system π, the budget set of i ∈ N is given by
Bi (π)
=
{
x∈Lmp |x is non-negative and i-measurable and
∫
Ω
π·xdµ≤
∫
Ω
π·eidµ
}
.
A Walrasian expectations equilibrium (WEE) of E is a pair (x, π), where π is a
price system and x =(x1, ..., xn) is a private allocation such that for every i ∈ N
xi maximizes U i on Bi(π). Denote by WEE(E) the set of WEE in E .
The following theorem (whose proof, together with all other proofs, is brought
in Sect. 6) establishes upper semi-continuity of the WEE correspondence.
Theorem 1. Let {Ek}∞k=1 be a sequence of economies Ek = (eik, uik,ik)ni=1 with
differential information that converges to E = (ei, ui,i)ni=1, where ei is strictly
positive for every i ∈ N . If {(xk, πk)}∞k=1 is a sequence such that (xk, πk) ∈
WEE(Ek) for every k, and for every i ∈ N, xik →
Lmp
k→∞ x
i, πk →L
m
q
k→∞ π, then
(x,π) ∈ WEE(E).
One may ask whether the Lmq -norm convergence of price systems can be re-
placed with the weak* convergence15, without affecting the result. The answer is
negative, as will be made clear in Example 1 of the next section. In this example
we will also show that confining attention to WEE allocations only does not yield
an upper semi-continuous correspondence.
4 Continuity of the private core
In this section we study the continuity of the private core of an economy with
differential information, introduced inYannelis (1991).
Let E = (ei, ui,i)ni=1 be an economy with differential information. The
private core of E consists of all private allocations x = (x1, ..., xn) for which there
do not exist a non-empty coalition S ⊆ N and a private S-allocation y = (yi)i∈S ,
such that
U i
(
yi
)
> U i
(
xi
) (3)
15 When 1 < p, the weak* convergence is of course equivalent to the weak convergence.
6
for every i ∈ S.
As was said in the introduction, in complete information economies the core
correspondence is upper semi-continuous (see, e.g., Kannai, 1970). Therefore, it is
natural to ask whether upper semi-continuity holds for economies with differential
information. That is, if {xk}∞k=1 is a sequence of private core allocations in a
converging sequence of economies {Ek}∞k=1, and {xk}∞k=1 converges to x, is x a
private core allocation of the limiting economy E? The following example shows
that the answer may be negative for all converging sequences {xk}∞k=1, even in
very simple economies.
Example 1. For every k = 0, 1, 2, ... let Ek be an economy in which m = 1,
n = 2, e1k = e
2
k ≡ 12 , Ω = [0, 1] ∪ [2, 3], µ is the restriction of the Lebesgue
measure on the real line to Ω (normalized so as to satisfy µ(Ω) = 1), u1k(ω, x) ={
x, if ω ∈ [0, 1] ,
0, if ω ∈ [2, 3] ; , u
2
k(ω, x) =
{
0, if ω ∈ [0, 1],
x, if ω ∈ [2, 3] . . For k > 0, private infor-
mation fields of agents are given as follows: 1k is the finite field generated by
[0, 1] ∪ [2, 2 + 12k ], (2 + 12k , 3], and 2k is the finite field generated by [0, 1], [2, 3].
For k = 0, 1 = 2 is the finite field generated by [0, 1], [2, 3].
Let xk = (x1k, x2k) be a private core allocation16 in the economy Ek. Since xk
is private, it has the form
xk =
(
a1 (k)χ[0,1]∪[2,2+ 12k ] + a2 (k)χ(2+ 12k ,3], b1 (k)χ[0,1] + b2 (k)χ[2,3]
)
(where χA stands for the indicator function of the set A); the equality holds almost
everywhere. The feasibility constraint (1) taken for ω ∈ [0, 1] and ω ∈ [2, 2 + 12k ]
(with S = N ) yields
a1 (k) + b1 (k) ≤ 1, and a1 (k) + b2 (k) ≤ 1. (4)
Note that
a1 (k) ≥ 12 (5)
since, otherwise, for S = {1} the S-allocation y =(e1k) satisfies
U1
(
y1
)
> U1
(
x1k
)
,
contrary to xk being a private core allocation in the economy Ek (that is, xk is not
individually rational). Individual rationality of xk also implies
b2 (k) ≥ 12 . (6)
From (5), (6), and (4) we deduce that
a1 (k) = b2 (k) =
1
2
.
16 Existence of a private core allocation in such an economy can be established by using arguments
of Glycopantis, Muir andYannelis (2001) (where existence was established with the “no free disposal”
condition). Alternatively, one can show nonemptiness of the private core of Eε by checking that it
contains the initial endowments allocation.
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Consider now a converging subsequence of {(a1(k), a2(k), b1(k), b2(k))}∞k=1.
It exists since 0 ≤ a1(k), a2(k), b1(k), b2(k) ≤ 1 by the feasibility constraint, and
w.l.o.g. wewill assume that the sequence itself converges. This implies convergence
of {xk}∞k=1 pointwise almost everywhere (and thus in L11-norm, or more generally
any L1p-norm for 1 ≤ p < ∞ due to the boundedness of the sequence) to
x =
(
a1χ[0,1] + a2χ[2,3], b1χ[0,1] + b2χ[2,3]
)
,
with a1 = b2 = 12 .Also, {Ek}∞k=1 converges to E0.However, x is not a private core
allocation of E0. Indeed, take S = N and y = (χ[0,1], χ[2,3]). This y is obviously
a private allocation in E0, and
U i
(
yi
)
> U i
(
xi
)
is satisfied for every i (that is, x is not Pareto-optimal).
Note that this example would still work if the utility functions were slightly
modified to become strictly concave and strictly increasing. The compact set Ω
could also be made connected without affecting our claim.
Our final observation is that there is a sequence of WEE in {Ek}∞k=1 that does
not converge to a WEE in E0. Indeed, the “no trade” scenario (e, πk), where e
consists of the initial endowments of the agents and πk (viewed as a function in
L1q) is given by
πk =
{
(4k)
1
q χ[2,2+ 12k ], if q < ∞,
χ[2,2+ 12k ], if q = ∞
,
constitutes a WEE in Ek. However, {πk}∞k=1 clearly does not converge in the L1q-
norm. It does converge weakly*, but to the zero function. This shows that Theorem
1 cannot be strengthened by assuming that {πk}∞k=1 converges to π weakly* (since
π can be zero despite that ‖πk‖q = 1 for every k).
In the limiting economy E0, every WEE has the form (y, π), where y =
(χ[0,1], χ[2,3]) (almost everywhere) and
∫
[0,1] π(ω)dµ(ω) =
∫
[2,3] π(ω)dµ(ω).
This shows that the set of WEE allocations WEEA is also not upper semi-
continuous: e ∈WEEA(Ek) for every k, but WEEA(E0) = {y} and
y = e. unionsq
In the above example the limiting information field is neither included, nor
includes, the information fields that converge to it. However, when this does not
occur, positive results on upper semi-continuity of the private core can be obtained.
Theorem 2. Let {Ek}∞k=1 = {(eik, uik,ik)ni=1}∞k=1 be a sequence of economies
with differential information that converges17 to E = (ei, ui,i)ni=1, such that

i
k ⊇ i for all i ∈ N and k. If {xk}∞k=1 is such that xk = (x1k, ..., xnk ) is a private
core allocation in Ek, and for every i ∈ N xik →L
m
1
k→∞ x
i
, then x = (x1, ..., xn) is
a private core allocation in E .
17 Convergence of information fields in Boylan pseudo-metric (which is one of the aspects of conver-
gence of economies) is not, in fact, necessary for this theorem.
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According to Theorem 2, if the information fields of agents shrink when they
approach the limiting information fields (which can be the case when, e.g., the
level of random noise increases in the limit), then the private core is upper semi-
continuous. Theorem 3 below may be viewed as a dual result, showing that the
private core is also upper semi-continuous when the information of agents expands
to the fullest possible extent, i.e., when the economies converge to a complete in-
formation economy. As was said in the Introduction, it is related to the result of
Balder and Yannelis (2002), who established continuity of the private core cor-
respondence in more general economies, but when information endowments are
increasing monotonically. At the same time, Theorem 3 stands in contrast to the
result of Krasa and Shafer (2001), that shows generic discontinuity of the private
core correspondencewhen the complete information is approached by changing the
common prior belief of agents (rather than by expanding their information fields).
Theorem 3. Let {Ek}∞k=1 = {(eik, uik,ik)ni=1}∞k=1 be a sequence of economies
with differential information that converges to E = (ei, ui,i)ni=1, wherei = 
for every i ∈ N,  is the σ-field of all Borel sets in Ω, and each ei is a continuous
and strictly positive function. Assume also that for every two disjoint and closed
subsets A and B of Ω there exist Aik ∈ ik for every i and k such that A ⊆ Aik
and Aik ∩B = ∅ for all sufficiently large k (that is,ik can separate disjoint closed
sets for all sufficiently large k). Then, if {xk}∞k=1 is such that xk = (x1k, ..., xnk ) is
a private core allocation in Ek and for every i ∈ N xik →L
m
1
k→∞ x
i
, x = (x1, ..., xn)
is a private core allocation in E .
5 The coarse core
Let E = (ei, ui,i)ni=1 be an economy with differential information. The coarse
core of E consists of all allocations x = (x1, ..., xn) for which there do not exist
a non-empty coalition S ⊆ N, an event A ∈ ∧i∈S i with µ(A) > 0 (where∧
i∈S 
i denotes the intersection of all i, i ∈ S, and represents the common
knowledge of agents in S), and an S-assignment y = (yi)i∈S , that satisfy the
following conditions:
(i)∑i∈S yi(ω) ≤∑i∈S ei(ω) for almost every ω ∈ A;
(ii)18 E(ui(·, yi(·)) | i)(ω) > E(ui(·, xi(·)) | i)(ω) for almost every ω ∈ A
and i ∈ S.
According to (i), y is feasible for agents in S, given the event A and their
initial endowments. And (ii) means that agents in S can improve their conditional
expected utility when they redistribute their endowments according to y, given that
A occurred. The concept of coarse core (introduced byWilson, 1978) thus disallows
existence of such S, A, and y.
Wilson (1978) proved that the coarse core is non-empty under standard condi-
tions on the economy, at least when the set of states of nature is finite. The following
18 Recall that E(X | ′) stands for the conditional expectation of X with respect to ′.
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example shows that the coarse core may not be upper semi-continuous, even when
the private core is19.
Example 2. Consider a sequence of economies Ek = (eik, uik,ik)ni=1 with m = 2
and n = 4, where:
1) uik is state-independent, and uik(x1, x2) = u(x1, x2) = (
√
x1+
√
x2)2 for every
i, k;
2) eik is state-independent, and e1k = e3k = (10, 110), e2k = e4k = (110, 10), for
every k;
3) the compact space of states Ω is the sequence {ωj}∞j=0, where ω0 = 0, and
ωj = 1j for j ≥ 1;
4) µ is a measure on Ω according to which µ({ω2j}) = µ({ω2j+1}) > 0 for every
j ≥ 0;
5) 1k = 2k = {∅, {ω2j}∞j=0 , {ω2j+1}∞j=0 , Ω}; that is, 1 and 2 can only tell
whether the realized state of nature has even or odd index;
6) 3k = 4k is the minimal σ-field in Ω that contains {ω0}, {ω1}, ..., {ωk}, and
{ωj}∞j=k; that is, 3 and 4 can actually know the state of nature, provided its index
is less than k.
It is clear that the sequence {Ek}∞k=1 converges to an economy E =
(ei, ui,i)ni=1, which differs from economies in {Ek}∞k=1 only in the following
respect: 3 = 4 is the field of all subsets of Ω.
Now consider an assignment x = (x1, x2, x3, x4), where x1(ω2j) =
x2(ω2j+1) = (50, 50) and x1(ω2j+1) = x2(ω2j) = (70, 70) for every j ≥ 0,
and x3 = x4 ≡ (60, 60). It is obvious that x is an allocation for all economies in
{Ek}∞k=1 , and for E .
We show first that x is not a coarse core allocation for E . Indeed, S = {2, 3}
can improve the conditional expected utility of both 2 and 3 given that the state of
nature has an odd index. We simply take A = {ω2j+1}∞j=0 (which is clearly in the
common knowledge of 2 and 3 in E : A ∈ 2 ∧ 3), and y = (yi)i∈S defined by
y2(ω2j+1) ≡ (51, 51), y3(ω2j+1) ≡ (69, 69). Then (i) and (ii) are satisfied, and
hence x is not a coarse core allocation for E .
Our next step is to show thatx is a coarse core allocation for every Ek. (This will
imply that the coarse core correspondence indeed lacks upper semi-continuity.) To
this end suppose that there are k, S, A, and y that satisfy (i) and (ii) in the economy
Ek. It is easy to see that x is individually rational (given each trader’s information),
and so S must contain more than one trader.
19 In this example, information fields of the first two agents are fixed in the converging sequence of
economies, while for the other (last) two agents the information fields approximate full infomation.
The proof of Theorem 3 can be used to show that the limit of any converging sequence of private core
allocations will be a private core allocation in the limiting economy (commodity bundles y1 and y2, if
used by a blocking coalition in E , will not even have to be approximated by a continuous function in
order to show that E(y1 | 1k) and E(y2 | 2k) approximate them uniformly).
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Note that (ii) implies∫
A
u
(
yi (ω)
)
dµ (ω) =
∫
A
E
(
u
(
yi (·)) | i) (ω) dµ (ω)
>
∫
A
E
(
u
(
xi (·)) | i) (ω) dµ (ω) = ∫
A
u
(
xi (ω)
)
dµ (ω)
for every i ∈ S, since A is an element of every Fi. Therefore∑
i∈S
∫
A
u
(
yi (ω)
)
dµ (ω) >
∑
i∈S
∫
A
u
(
xi (ω)
)
dµ (ω) . (7)
At the same time, from concavity and homogeneity of u and (i) it follows that:∑
i∈S
∫
A
u
(
yi (ω)
)
dµ (ω) ≤ u
(∑
i∈S
∫
A
yi (ω) dµ (ω)
)
=
(√∑
i∈S
∫
A
yi (ω)1 dµ (ω) +
√∑
i∈S
∫
A
yi (ω)2 dµ (ω)
)2
≤
2
√∑
i∈S
∫
A
(yi (ω)1 + yi (ω)2) dµ (ω)
2
2
= 2
∫
A
∑
i∈S
(
yi (ω)1 + y
i (ω)2
)
dµ (ω)
≤ 2
∫
A
∑
i∈S
(
ei (ω)1 + e
i (ω)2
)
dµ (ω) = 2
∫
A
120 |S| dµ (ω)
= 240 |S|µ(A).
Thus ∑
i∈S
∫
A
u
(
yi (ω)
)
dµ (ω) ≤ 240 |S|µ(A). (8)
If S = {1, 2} or S = {3, 4}, then for each ω∑i∈S u(xi(ω)) = 480 = 240|S|,
and so (7) and (8) are inconsistent. Since |S| > 1 (as was mentioned), we are left
with the possibility that S ∩ {1, 2} = ∅ and S ∩ {3, 4} = ∅. Then A = Ω since
the common knowledge of all the agents in S (where A belongs) contains only
trivial information20, and µ(A) > 0. However, clearly
∫
Ω
u(xi(ω))dµ(ω) = 240
for every i ∈ N, and therefore∑
i∈S
∫
Ω
u
(
xi (ω)
)
dµ (ω) = 240 |S| .
Thus, (7) and (8) lead to a contradiction again. We conclude that there exist no k,
S, A, and y that satisfy (i) and (ii) in the economy Ek, and therefore x is a coarse
core allocation in every Ek. unionsq
20 I.e., the field {∅, Ω}.
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6 Proofs
Lemma 1. Let {k}∞k=1 be a sequence of σ-subfields of that converges to0 in
Boylan pseudo-metric, and let {Xk}∞k=1 be a sequence of functions inL1(Ω,, µ)
that converges to X in L1-norm. If Xk is k-measurable for every k, then X is
0-measurable.
Proof. We will show that X = E(X | 0) almost everywhere. Since L1-norm
convergence implies convergence inmeasure, {Xk}∞k=1 converges toX inmeasure.
Thus, it suffices to show that {Xk}∞k=1 converges in measure also to E(X | 0).
From k-measurability of Xk, Xk = E(Xk | k) almost everywhere. Thus,
almost everywhere,
|Xk − E (X | 0)| = |E (Xk | k) − E (X | 0)| (9)
≤ |E (Xk | k) − E (X | k)| + |E (X | k) − E (X | 0)| . (10)
For every k,∫
Ω
|E (Xk | k) − E (X | k)| dµ ≤
∫
Ω
E (|Xk − X| | k) dµ
=
∫
Ω
|Xk (ω) − X (ω)| dµ (ω) = ‖Xk − X‖1 .
Since ‖Xk − X‖1 →k→∞ 0, also
∫
Ω
|E(Xk | k) − E(X | k)|dµ →k→∞ 0,
and hence the first summand in (10) converges to zero in measure. And E(X |
k) →k→∞ E(X | 0) inmeasure byTheorem4 inBoylan (1971). Consequently,
by (9)–(10), {Xk}∞k=1 indeed converges in measure to E(X | 0). unionsq
Lemma 2. Let {uk}∞k=1 be a sequence of continuous functions on Ω × Rm+ such
that for every ω ∈ Ω the function uk(ω, ·) is concave, non-negative, and non-
decreasing21. Assume that {uk}∞k=1 converges to a function u uniformly on every
compact subset of Ω ×Rm+ . If {xk}∞k=1 is a sequence in Lm1 that converges to x in
the Lm1 -norm, then
lim
k→∞
∫
Ω
uk(ω, xk (ω))dµ (ω) =
∫
Ω
u(ω, x (ω))dµ (ω) .
Proof. Due to the uniform convergence of {uk}∞k=1, the sequence of Ck =
maxω∈Ω,‖x‖≤1 uk(ω, x) is bounded from above by some C > 0. Fix ε > 0.
Since {xk}∞k=1 converges to x in Lm1 -norm, {xk}∞k=1 is uniformly integrable (see
Proposition II.5.4 of Neveu, 1965) and x is integrable. Consequently, we can find
M > 1 with:
(i) sup
k
∫
{ω∈Ω|‖xk(ω)‖>M}
‖xk (ω)‖ dµ (ω) < ε9C ;
21 As will become evident in the proof, these three requirements could be replaced by the following
(weaker) condition: |uk(ω, x)| ≤ Ck max{‖x‖, 1} for all k, ω ∈ Ω, x ∈ Rl+, and some constant
Ck such that lim supk→∞ Ck < ∞.
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and
(ii)
∫
{ω∈Ω|‖x(ω)‖>M}
‖x (ω)‖ dµ (ω) < ε
9C
.
Note that concavity and monotonicity of each uk(ω, ·), and the convergence of
{uk}∞k=1 to u, imply that
u(ω, x), uk(ω, x) ≤ C max{‖x‖ , 1} (11)
for all k, ω ∈ Ω, and x ∈ Rl+. In particular, the integral
∫
Ω
u(ω, x(ω))dµ(ω) is
well defined.
Now,∣∣∣∣∫
Ω
uk(ω, xk (ω))dµ (ω) −
∫
Ω
u(ω, x (ω))dµ (ω)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∫
Ω
|uk(ω, xk (ω)) − u(ω, xk (ω))| dµ (ω)
+
∫
Ω
|u(ω, xk (ω)) − u(ω, x (ω))| dµ (ω)
=
∫
Ω
|uk(ω, xk (ω)) − u(ω, xk (ω))|χ{ω∈Ω|‖xk(ω)‖≤M}dµ (ω)
+
∫
{ω∈Ω|‖xk(ω)‖>M}
|uk(ω, xk (ω)) − u(ω, xk (ω))| dµ (ω)
+
∫
Ω
|u(ω, xk (ω)) − u(ω, x (ω))|χ{ω∈Ω|‖xk(ω)‖≤M and ‖x(ω)‖≤M}dµ (ω)
+
∫
{ω∈Ω|‖xk(ω)‖>M or ‖x(ω)‖>M}
|u(ω, xk (ω)) − u(ω, x (ω))| dµ (ω)
≡ I1 + I2 + I3 + I4.
(Here χS stands for the characteristic function of the set S).We will show that each
Ij is less than ε for all sufficiently large k, and this will prove the lemma.
The uniform convergence of {uk}∞k=1 to u on Ω × {x ∈ Rm+ | ‖x‖ ≤
M} immediately yields limk→∞ I1 = 0, and thus
I1 < ε
for all sufficiently large k. Inequality (11) implies that
I2 ≤ 2C
∫
{ω∈Ω|‖xk(ω)‖>M}
‖xk (ω)‖ dµ (ω) , (12)
and by our choice of M,
I2 < ε
for all k. Since xk converges to x in measure (as implied by the Lm1 -norm
convergence), and u(·, ·) is uniformly continuous on the compact set Ω ×
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{x ∈ Rm+ | ‖x‖ ≤ M} (being a continuous function), |u(ω, xk(ω)) −
u(ω, x(ω))| · χ{ω∈Ω|‖xk(ω)‖≤M and ‖x(ω)‖≤M} converges in measure to zero, and
thus limk→∞ I3 = 0 by the generalized bounded convergence theorem.Once again,
I3 < ε
for all sufficiently large k. Finally,
I4 =
∫
{ω∈Ω|‖xk(ω)‖>M or ‖x(ω)‖>M}
|u(ω, xk (ω)) − u(ω, x (ω))| dµ (ω)
≤
∫
{ω∈Ω|‖xk(ω)‖>M}
|u(ω, xk (ω)) − u(ω, x (ω))| dµ (ω)
+
∫
{ω∈Ω|‖x(ω)‖>M}
|u(ω, xk (ω)) − u(ω, x (ω))| dµ (ω)
≤ C
∫
{ω∈Ω|‖xk(ω)‖>M}
(‖xk (ω)‖ + max(‖x (ω)‖ , 1))dµ (ω)
+C
∫
{ω∈Ω|‖x(ω)‖>M}
(max(‖xk (ω)‖ , 1) + ‖x (ω)‖)dµ (ω)
≤ C
∫
{ω∈Ω|‖xk(ω)‖>M}
(2 ‖xk (ω)‖ + ‖x (ω)‖)dµ (ω)
+C
∫
{ω∈Ω|‖x(ω)‖>M}
(‖xk (ω)‖ + 2 ‖x (ω)‖)dµ (ω)
≤ C
∫
{ω∈Ω|‖xk(ω)‖>M}
(2 ‖xk (ω)‖ + ‖x (ω) − xk (ω)‖ + ‖xk (ω)‖)dµ (ω)
+C
∫
{ω∈Ω|‖x(ω)‖>M}
(‖xk (ω) − x (ω)‖ + ‖x (ω)‖ + 2 ‖x (ω)‖)dµ (ω)
≤ 2C
∫
Ω
‖xk (ω) − x0 (ω)‖ dµ (ω)
+3C
∫
{ω∈Ω|‖xk(ω)‖>M}
‖xk(ω)‖ dµ (ω)+3C
∫
{ω∈Ω|‖x0(ω)‖>M}
‖x0(ω)‖ dµ (ω)
≤ 2C
∫
Ω
‖xk (ω) − x0 (ω)‖ dµ (ω) + 2ε3 (by the choice of M ).
The first summand in the above expression is less than ε3 for all sufficiently large
k, which yields
I4 < ε. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 1. We have to show that (x, π) is a WEE of E . Note first that
x = (x1, ..., xn) is a private allocation in E . Indeed, each xi is i-measurable by
Lemma 1. Moreover, each Lm1 -norm convergent {xik}∞k=1 has a subsequence that
converges pointwise almost everywhere, and thus x also satisfies the feasibility
constraint (1) (for S = N ).
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Next, for every i ∈ N∣∣∣∣∫
Ω
(
πk · xik − π · xi
)
dµ
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∫
Ω
∣∣πk · (xik − xi)∣∣ dµ + ∫
Ω
∣∣(πk − π) · xi∣∣ dµ.
(13)
By Ho¨lder inequality,∫
Ω
∣∣πk · (xik − xi)∣∣ dµ ≤ ‖πk‖q ∥∥xik − xi∥∥p = ∥∥xik − xi∥∥p
and ∫
Ω
∣∣(πk − π) · xi∣∣ dµ ≤ ‖πk − π‖q ∥∥xi∥∥p .
However, limk→∞ ‖πk − π‖q = limk→∞ ‖xik − xi‖p = 0, and hence by (13)∫
Ω
πk · xikdµ →k→∞
∫
Ω
π · xidµ. (14)
It is also obvious that ∫
Ω
πk · eidµ →k→∞
∫
Ω
π · eidµ. (15)
From (14), (15) it follows that xi ∈ Bi(π) for every i ∈ N .
It remains to show that for every i ∈ N, xi maximizes U i on Bi(π). In-
deed, if this were not true, there would exist i ∈ N and yi ∈ Bi(π) with
U i(yi) > U i(xi). Since (1 − α)min(yi,M) →α↘0,M→∞ yi in Lm1 -norm,
U i((1 − α)min(yi,M)) →α↘0,M→∞ U i(yi) by Lemma 2, and thus w.l.o.g. yi
is bounded and satisfies22 ∫
Ω
π · yidµ <
∫
Ω
π · eidµ (16)
(otherwise it can be replaced by some (1 − α)min(yi,M)).
Now define yik ≡ E(yi | ik); it is ik-measurable. Since yik →k→∞ yi in
measure (by Theorem 4 of Boylan, 1971), yik →L
m
1
k→∞ y
i because of the uniform
boundedness of yik and yi, and it can be established similarly to (14) that∫
Ω
πk · yikdµ →k→∞
∫
Ω
π · yidµ.
Together with (15) and (16) this implies that yik ∈ Bi(πk) for all sufficiently large
k. But U i(yi) > U i(xi), and xik →L
m
1
k→∞ x
i, yik →L
m
1
k→∞ y
i. By Lemma 2, for all
sufficiently large k
U ik(y
i
k) > U
i
k(x
i
k),
22 We use the fact that
∫
Ω π · ei > 0, which is due to strict positivity of ei, and positivity of the
non-vanishing π.
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where U ik is defined by (2) for the utility function uk. This cannot be consistent
with yik ∈ Bi(πk) since (xk, πk) ∈ WEE(Ek).We reached a contradiction, which
leads to the conclusion that (x, π) ∈ WEE(E). unionsq
Proof of Theorem 2. As in the proof of Theorem 1, x = (x1, ..., xn) is a private
allocation in E . Assume, however, that x is not in the private core of E . Then there
exist a non-empty coalition S and a private S-allocation y = (yi)i∈S such that
U i
(
yi
)
> U i
(
xi
) (17)
for every i ∈ S.
We will now modify y to obtain an S-allocation in Ek for a certain large k. For
every ε > 0 denote
Aik,ε =
{
ω ∈ Ω | ∥∥eik (ω) − ei (ω)∥∥ < ε} ,
and let k(ε) be some positive integer such that
µ
(
Aik,ε
)
> 1 − ε for every i ∈ S (18)
holds for all k ≥ k(ε). Such k(ε) exists for every ε > 0, since eik →L
m
1
k→∞ e
i and
hence eik →k→∞ ei in measure. For this reason, we can also choose {k(ε)}ε>0 in
a way that k(ε) is non-increasing in ε and limε↘0 k(ε) = ∞23. Clearly, for almost
every ω ∈ Ω and every commodity j∑
i∈S
yi (ω) · χAi
k(ε),ε
(ω) ≤
∑
i∈S
eik(ε) (ω) + nε1,
where 1 = (1, ..., 1) ∈ Rm (this inequality follows from the fact that y satisfies
the feasibility constraint in E and the definition of Aik(ε),ε). Therefore, yk(ε) =
(yik(ε))i∈S , defined by
yik(ε) (ω)j ≡ max(yi (ω)j · χAik(ε),ε (ω) − nε, 0)
for everyω ∈ Ω and every commodity j, satisfies the feasibility constraint in Ek(ε) :∑
i∈S
yik(ε) (ω) ≤
∑
i∈S
eik(ε) (ω) for almost every ω ∈ Ω. (19)
Note that eachAik,ε isik-measurable (since both eik and ei areik-measurable due
to the inclusionik ⊇i), and so yik(ε) isik(ε)-measurable. From this fact and (19)
it follows that the sequence {yk( 1r )}∞r=1 is a sequence of private S-allocations in
economies {Ek( 1r )}∞r=1, and (18) implies that for each i ∈ S {yik( 1r )}
∞
r=1 converges
to yi in measure.
Since for each i ∈ S and r yi
k( 1r )
≤ yi, the sequence {yi
k( 1r )
}∞r=1 is bounded
from above by an integrable function. Therefore, its convergence in measure to
23 Or, at least, that k( 1
r
) is non-decreasing when r is a positive integer, and limr→∞ k( 1r ) = ∞.
16
yi implies convergence in the Lm1 -norm as well. However, according to this and
Lemma 2, for every i ∈ S
lim
r→∞ U
i
k( 1r )
(
yi
k( 1r )
)
= U i
(
yi
)
.
Also, since xik →L
m
1
k→∞ x
i
, for every i ∈ S
lim
r→∞ U
i
k( 1r )
(
xi
k( 1r )
)
= U i
(
xi
)
.
Due to assumption (17), these two equalities yield existence of r for which
U i
k( 1r )
(
yi
k( 1r )
)
> U i
k( 1r )
(
xi
k( 1r )
)
holds for every i ∈ S. This contradicts the assumption that xk( 1r ) is a private core
allocation in Ek( 1r ). unionsq
Proof of Theorem 3. As in the proof of Theorem 2, if the limit allocation x =
(x1, ..., xn) is not in the private core of E , there exist a non-empty coalition S and
a private S-allocation y = (yi)i∈S such that
U i
(
yi
)
> U i
(
xi
) (20)
for every i ∈ S. We can assume w.l.o.g. that each yi is bounded. (Otherwise it
can be replaced by min(yi,M), which converges to yi in Lm1 -norm as M → ∞.
Indeed, according to Lemma 2, U i(min(yi,M)) →M→∞ U i(yi), and thus this
replacement will leave (20) intact for sufficiently largeM.Clearly, the replacement
also leads to a private allocation.) We will show next that it can also be assumed
w.l.o.g. that each yi is continuous.
By Lusin theorem, for every ε > 0 and i ∈ S there exists a continuous function
yiε on Ω, such that µ(Aiε) < ε where Aiε = {ω | yi(ω) = yiε(ω)}.Also denote
Bε = {ω | there exists j with
∑
i∈S
yiε(ω)j ≥
∑
i∈S
ei(ω)j + ε}
and
B =
{
ω |
∑
i∈S
yiε (ω) ≤
∑
i∈S
ei (ω)
}
.
Since these subsets of a compact metric space Ω are disjoint and closed (here we
use continuity of both ei and yiε for every i ∈ S), they can be separated, i.e., there
is a continuous function c : Ω → [0, 1] such that c ≡ 1 on B and c ≡ 0 on Bε.
Thus, y˜ε = (y˜iε)i∈S given by
y˜iε (ω)j ≡ max(c (ω) · yiε (ω)j − ε, 0)
for every i ∈ S, commodity j, and ω ∈ Ω, satisfies the feasibility constraint in E :∑
i∈S
y˜iε (ω) ≤
∑
i∈S
ei (ω) for every ω ∈ Ω.
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Since each y˜iε isi-measurable as a continuous function on Ω (recall thati = 
is the σ-field of all Borel sets in Ω), y˜ε is in fact a private S-allocation that consists
of continuous functions. Moreover, for each i ∈ S and a commodity j
yiε (ω)j − ε ≤ y˜iε (ω)j ≤ yiε (ω)j (21)
for almost every ω ∈ ⋂i∈S(Aiε)c, since y satisfies the feasibility con-
straint
∑
i∈S y
i(ω) ≤ ∑i∈S ei(ω) for almost every ω ∈ Ω and hence
µ(
⋂
i∈S(A
i
ε)
c\B) = 0. Clearly µ(⋂i∈S(Aiε)c) > 1 − nε, and together with (21)
this implies that functions in y˜ε converge in measure to those in y as ε ↘ 0. From
the (obvious) uniform boundedness24 of y˜ε and y it follows that the convergence
is in the Lm1 -norm as well. By Lemma 2 and (20),
U i
(
y˜iε0
)
> U i
(
xi
)
for every i ∈ S and some sufficiently small ε0. Thus, by replacing y in (20) by y˜ε0
if necessary, we can w.l.o.g. assume that (20) holds fory that consists of continuous
functions.
For every k = 1, 2, ... and i ∈ S define zik = E(yi | ik); zik is clearly ik-
measurable and is (or can be chosen to be) bounded by the same constant as yi.
We will show that a subsequence of {zik}∞k=1 converges to yi uniformly (almost
everywhere). For every commodity j and twopositive integersK, lwith 0 ≤ l ≤ K,
consider a pair of closed25 subsets of Ω :
ClK (j) =
{
ω | l − 1
K
max
ω∈Ω
yij ≤ yi (ω)j ≤
l
K
max
ω∈Ω
yij
}
and
C˜lK (j) =
{
ω | l − 2
K
max
ω∈Ω
yij ≥ yi (ω)j or
l + 1
K
max
ω∈Ω
yij ≤ yi (ω)j
}
.
Since ik can separate disjoint closed sets for all sufficiently large k, for every K
there exists k = k(K) independent of i and j such thatik(K) separatesClK(j) from
C˜lK(j) for every j and 1 ≤ l ≤ K; it can also be assumed that limK→∞ k(K) = ∞.
Thus for every j and 1 ≤ l ≤ K there is a set DlK(j) ∈ ik(K) such that{
ω | l − 1
K
max
ω∈Ω
yij ≤ yi (ω)j ≤
l
K
max
ω∈Ω
yij
}
⊂ DlK (j)
(and hence D1K(j), D2K(j), ..., DKK (j) cover Ω), and
DlK (j) ⊂
{
ω | l − 2
K
max
ω∈Ω
yij < y
i (ω)j <
l + 1
K
max
ω∈Ω
yij
}
.
Consequently, for every j and 1 ≤ l ≤ K, and almost every ω ∈ DlK(j),
zik(K) (ω)j − yi (ω)j = E(yij | ik(K)) (ω) − yi (ω)j
24 Here we use the (w.l.o.g.) assumption that the commodity bundles in y are bounded functions.
25 Closedness is due to the continuity of yi.
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(here we use the fact that DlK(j) ∈ ik(K))
= E(yij · χDlK(j) | 
i
k(K)) (ω) − yi (ω)j
≤ E
(
l + 1
K
max
ω∈Ω
yij · χDlK(j) | 
i
k(K)
)
(ω) − l − 2
K
max
ω∈Ω
yij
=
l + 1
K
max
ω∈Ω
yij −
l − 2
K
max
ω∈Ω
yij =
3
K
max
ω∈Ω
yij .
Similarly,
zik(K) (ω)j − yi (ω)j ≥ −
3
K
max
ω∈Ω
yij
for almost every ω ∈ DlK(j). We conclude that∣∣∣zik(K) (ω)j − yi (ω)j∣∣∣ ≤ 3K maxω∈Ω yij ≡ δK (j) for almost every ω ∈ Ω.
(This means that {zik(K)}∞K=1 converges to yi uniformly (almost everywhere).)
Thus∑
i∈S
zik(K) (ω)j ≤
∑
i∈S
yi (ω)j + nδK (j) ≤
∑
i∈S
ei (ω)j + nδK (j) (22)
for almost every ω ∈ Ω.
Now denote
yik(K) (ω)j ≡ max(zik(K) (ω)j − nδK (j) , 0)
for every i ∈ S, commodity j, and ω ∈ Ω. It is clear that {yik(K)}∞K=1 converges
to yi uniformly, and that (from (22)) the feasibility constraint∑
i∈S
yik(K) (ω)j ≤
∑
i∈S
ei (ω)j
is satisfied for every j and almost every ω ∈ Ω. Each yik(K) is also ik(K)-
measurable, since so is zik(K). We conclude that {yk(K)}∞K=1, where yk(K) =
(yik(K))i∈S , is a sequence of private S-allocations in economies {Ek(K)}∞K=1.Uni-
form convergence of functions implies convergence in Lm1 -norm, and hence, ac-
cording to Lemma 2, for every i ∈ S
lim
K→∞
U ik(K)
(
yik(K)
)
= U i
(
yi
)
and lim
K→∞
U ik(K)
(
xik(K)
)
= U i
(
xi
)
.
Due to (20), there exists K such that
U ik(K)
(
yik(K)
)
> U ik(K)
(
xik(K)
)
for every i ∈ S. This contradicts the assumption that xk(K) is a private core
allocation in Ek(K). unionsq
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